"Agriculture by contract" () is the main Mexican government program aimed at mitigating price risks for agricultural producers in Mexico. [Math Processing Error] 
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Production and price risks are among the most common concerns for agricultural producers. In some instances, the private sector has devised tools to manage some of such risks without any kind of government support. This is the case of hail insurance (which involves non-systemic production risks) and futures and options markets (which can be used to manage price risks).
Quite often, however, governments have intervened by designing policies aimed at curbing the production or price risks faced by farmers (Gardner 1987 ).
In the case of production risks, some governments provide subsidized yield insurance and/or emergency assistance when yields are extremely poor. In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the federal crop insurance program legislated under the 2014 Farm Bill will require subsidies of 89.8 billion U.S. dollars over 10 years (Shields 2014) . 1 The public sector provides some kind of support in 16 out of the 18 Latin
American countries where agricultural insurance is available (World Bank 2010) . Agricultural insurance subsidies in Brazil and Mexico amounted to 294 million dollars in 2009, accounting for 90% of the region's total public support for agricultural insurance in that year (World Bank 2010) . Rather than subsidizing insurance, governments in Caribbean countries, Bolivia, and Nicaragua provide post-disaster assistance (World Bank 2010) . Over 1995 Over -2005 payments for relief from natural disasters averaged about 1.2 billion dollars in the United States and 0.5 billion dollars in the European Union (Johnson, Hanrahan, and Schnepf 2010) .
In regard to farmers' price risks, governments have intervened in a number of ways (Dana and Gilbert 2009) . Price supports through government purchases or deficiency payments have been among the most common government-instituted price-risk management tools. Both mechanisms have been used by the United States over the last century, and are currently employed in Brazil (DTB Associates 2011; USDA-ERS 2012). Other types of intervention aimed at mitigating price risks have included variable tariff schemes (as in Chile and Colombia (Knudsen and Nash 1990) ), the creation of government marketing boards to act as monopsonies (e.g., the Australian Wheat Board and the Canadian Wheat Board), international trade agreements (e.g., the International Cocoa Agreements and the International Coffee Agreements), as well as complex mechanisms involving long-term storage coupled with minimum prices and production restrictions aimed at maintaining prices within certain bands (as in the United States over most of the 20th century).
Contrasting with the aforementioned schemes aimed at mitigating price risks for agricultural producers, Mexico has used a fairly unique government program since the mid1990s called "agriculture by contracts" (translated from the Spanish "agricultura por contrato"), typically abbreviated as "A×C." As explained in the next section, A×C involves the provision of subsidized market-based risk-management tools; more specifically, derivative contracts traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The magnitude of A×C has increased dramatically over time, with government expenditures exploding from about 11 million dollars in 2001 to over 700 million dollars in 2010.
Despite the significant resources devoted by the Mexican government to this novel pricerisk mitigating mechanism, to the best of our knowledge it has not been the subject of standard economic welfare analysis. 2 A likely reason for the lack of studies addressing its welfare impact is that, unlike more conventional programs, it requires the specification of a model involving not only production and price uncertainty, but also more than one decision time. The explicit modeling of uncertainty and risk preferences is critical for a proper evaluation of programs aimed at mitigating risks, but imposes substantial computational challenges.
The objective of the present study is to perform an economic welfare analysis of A×C for the case of corn. In the process, we show how to build a simulation model able to incorporate key features of the program. In particular, the advocated model allows for uncertain outcomes and risk-averse producers. The model also exhibits more than one decision time, as participation in A×C requires signing forward contracts after planting but before harvest. In addition, "intermediaries" 3 are explicitly modeled, and are assumed to possess market power to better reflect the reality of agricultural markets in Mexico.
Mexico's "Agriculture by Contracts" Program
In recent years, A×C has been the most important government-sponsored program aimed at mitigating price risks for crop producers in Mexico. Direct subsidies paid through A×C averaged approximately 7.55 billion Mexican pesos (about 605 million dollars) per year over 2008 (SAGARPA 2010c . 5 By contrast, the second largest price-risk mitigating program (minimum price, officially called "ingreso objetivo" in Mexico) paid out only 4% as much as A×C over the same period. 6 The A×C program covers several crops, including barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, soybean, and wheat. However, A×C payments are extremely concentrated among corn, sorghum, and wheat, which is not surprising because they account for most of the area planted.
For example, in 2010 corn (52%), sorghum (20%), and wheat (18%) received 90% of the A×C payments, and accounted for 94% of the area planted with the eight aforementioned crops (SIAP 2015; ASERCA 2011) . 7 A×C covers a significant proportion of the amount produced for such crops (e.g., 45% for corn, 62% for sorghum, and 53% for wheat in the fall/winter cycle of 2009/10) (ASERCA 2011). A×C subsidies are very heavily concentrated geographically, with the state producing most of a crop receiving an even larger share of the crop's A×C outlays: The state of Sinaloa (Tamaulipas, Sonora) produced 74% (83%, 55%) of the corn (sorghum, wheat) in the 2009/10 fall/winter cycle, and accounted for 90% (96%, 66%) of the cycle's A×C corn (sorghum, wheat) payments (SIAP 2015; ASERCA 2011) .
The A×C program is a complex mechanism involving unique features. It is based on a forward contract that producers and intermediaries must sign and register at designated government offices over a specified period of time, typically shortly after the planting season for the corresponding crop (SAGARPA 2010c). Each forward contract stipulates the volume of crop that producers will deliver to intermediaries at post-harvest, and the corresponding dollardenominated forward price for the transaction. The forward price consists of an officiallydetermined forward basis, plus the CME closing price on the contract registration date for futures maturing immediately after the agreed-upon delivery date. The contract also specifies that the dollar-denominated forward price is to be converted into pesos at the official exchange rate observed at the moment of issuing the invoice for the physical transaction of the crop. Under the contract, at post-harvest intermediaries (participants) are legally obligated to receive from participants (deliver to intermediaries) the crop volume stipulated in the contract, and pay (receive from) them the forward price converted to pesos.
The A×C forward basis is determined by negotiations involving government officials and representatives of producers and intermediaries, where they discuss the estimated underlying costs (e.g., transportation, handling, and storage costs). Once an agreement is reached, the forward basis is officially announced, typically at the same time the government announces the official period over which forward contracts must be registered. There is a single forward basis for each major production region, i.e., the forward basis is identical for all of the A×C contracts corresponding to a crop produced in a particular region.
By registering the forward contracts with the government and abiding by the A×C rules, producers and intermediaries gain access to two types of subsidies, namely, subsidized futures options and compensatory basis. The subsidies involving futures options are essentially cost-free at-the-money calls for producers and cost-free at-the-money puts for intermediaries. The compensatory basis is a payment to producers or intermediaries, depending on which party experiences an unfavorable change in the dollar-denominated basis.
Upon registration of an A×C contract, the Mexican government buys at-the-money futures calls and puts at the CME for the crop volume stipulated in the contract. The futures underlying the calls and puts is the same as the one used to determine the A×C forward price.
The options positions are canceled at the time the crop is delivered to fulfill the A×C contract.
Gains in the call (put) position accrue to the producers (intermediaries), previous deduction of up to a maximum share of the initial premium to cover the government's cost to buy the call (put).
The compensatory basis, officially named "compensación de bases," consists of a government payment to producers (intermediaries) if the realized "official" basis at post-harvest is greater (smaller) than the forward basis. Similar to the forward basis, the realized official basis is settled in a negotiated manner by government officials and representatives of producers and intermediaries, and there is a single realized basis for each major production region. The agreedupon realized official basis is announced to the public at post-harvest.
The compensatory basis is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the realized official basis and the forward basis; it accrues to producers if the realized basis exceeds the forward basis, and to intermediaries otherwise. Since the forward basis and the realized basis are both denominated in dollars per crop unit, the total amount paid by the government equals the compensatory basis times the amount of crop involved in the forward contract, valued at the prevailing official exchange rate.
Theoretical Model
The A×C program changes the distributions of the actual payoffs received by producers and intermediaries. Such distributions are endogenous and affected by risk attitudes, because marketclearing prices and ultimately the payoffs themselves depend on the agents' responses to A×C, which in turn are driven by their risk preferences. Therefore, to evaluate A×C's market and welfare impacts, we resort to a rational expectations equilibrium displacement model that incorporates risk preferences and allows for both probabilistic and endogenous payoffs.
The closest model to the one advocated here is Lence (2009a) . Agents are assumed to hold rational expectations (i.e., agents' subjective beliefs regarding the probability distributions are the same as the actual distributions). Unlike Lence, however, interannual speculative storage is not included, which enables us to incorporate two key A×C features into the model, namely, intermediaries (with market power) and a decision time between planting and post-harvest (to enter contracts). Allowing for speculative interannual storage would render the proposed model numerically intractable because of the "curse of dimensionality" (i.e., it would not be possible to solve the model due to the large number of dimensions involved). Importantly, however, the assumption of no speculative interannual storage does not seem overly restrictive for the present purposes, because Mexico's historical data suggest that speculative demand is dwarfed by the demand for current consumption.
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To capture the essential elements of A×C, the model involves decision making and/or market-clearing conditions at three points in time, namely, "planting" (t = 0), "contracting" (t = 1), and "post-harvest" (t = 2). Figure 1 summarizes At planting, farmers choose the optimal expected crop output. Being rational, this decision incorporates their knowledge of the A×C program and rules as of planting time (e.g., producers know that the subsidized options will be at the money, and that the strike price won't be known until contracting). At contracting, participants and intermediaries sign contracts stipulating the volume of crop to be traded at post-harvest and the corresponding dollardenominated forward price for the transaction, consisting of the time-1 futures price for postharvest maturity at the CME (F 1 ), plus the forward basis (B 1 ). The dollar-denominated forward price is to be converted into pesos at the official exchange rate prevailing at post-harvest (X 2 ).
At post-harvest all of the uncertainties are resolved. Contractual obligations are fulfilled, and non-participants sell their output to intermediaries in the spot market. Intermediaries also import crop from the world market (which is characterized by an infinitely elastic supply at the prevailing world price), process the crop, and sell the processed product to final consumers in the spot market. Consumer demand for final product at post-harvest satisfies standard regularity conditions (e.g., it is a differentiable and negatively-sloped function of price). 
That is, both the net price received by and paid to participants include the forward price (F 1 + B 1 )
converted into pesos at the prevailing exchange rate (X 2 ). In addition, A×C participants receive the compensatory basis (ProdCompBas 2 ≥ 0) and the call subsidy (CallSubsidy 2 ≥ 0), whereas intermediaries get the intermediary compensatory basis (IntCompBas 2 ≥ 0) and the put subsidy (PutSubsidy 2 ≥ 0). The compensatory basis and the option subsidies create a gap between the net prices received by and paid to participants.
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The producer compensatory basis is an additional payment that participants receive when the post-harvest basis is higher than the forward basis. It is defined as
where B 2 ≡ ( ,2 MG P / /X 2 -F 2 ) is the realized post-harvest basis (expressed in dollars per crop unit).
Similarly, the intermediary compensatory basis IntCompBas 2 ≡ max(B 1 -B 2 , 0) X 2 is a subsidy paid to intermediaries when the realized post-harvest basis is smaller than the forward basis.
The call and put subsidies are given by (4)
where ω G ∈ [0, 1] and ω G ∈ [0, 1] are A×C cost-recovery parameters, and Call 1 and Put 1 are respectively the time-1 premiums for the corresponding at-the-money CME futures calls and puts. The call (put) subsidy benefits participants (intermediaries) if futures rise (fall) between contracting and post-harvest.
The next two subsections discuss domestic farmers and intermediaries in greater detail, as A×C directly affects them. The last subsection addresses the welfare impact of A×C.
Domestic Crop Production
Let g index the type of farmers (i.e., g = G and g = G / refer to participants and non-participants, respectively). Following Lence (2009a) , aggregate crop output by farmers of type g is given by Q g,2 = n g q g,2 , where n g is the number of type-g producers and q g,2 is the corresponding average output per farmer. The amount produced equals q g,2 = q g,0 ε g,1 ε g,2 , where q g,0 ≡ E 0 (q g,2 ) is the expected output as of planting, and ε g,1 and ε g,2 represent the exogenous output shocks occurring between planting and post-harvest. Output shocks must be positive (ε g,1 , ε g,2 ≥ 0) because output cannot be negative.
At planting, type-g farmers choose the level of expected output * ,0 g q that maximizes the expected utility of their post-harvest profits π g,2 (q)
In this expression, U g (•) and C g (•) denote, respectively, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the cost function of type-g farmers, and P g,2 represents the net price received by type-g producers at post-harvest. Cost function C g (•) satisfies standard regularity conditions (e.g.,
is continuous, increasing, and convex).
Intermediaries
Letting q mG,2 , ,2 mG q / , and q mW,2 be respectively the m th intermediary's crop acquisitions from participants, non-participants, and the world market, the amount of crop processed and sold by such firm in crop-equivalent units is q mD,2 = q mG,2 + ,2 mG q / + q mW,2 . Intermediary m's post-harvest profits can be represented as: Intermediaries take world prices and exchange rates as given, but they are aware that their decisions influence the prices they receive for the final product (P D,2 ) and the net prices they pay to producers (P Mg,2 ). Intermediaries' power in the procurement market effectively means that they take into account their impact on the forward basis (B 1 ) and the realized post-harvest basis (B 2 ), because / mG q / ∂ = 0) can be expressed as:
In (9) implies that the forward basis (B 1 ), contracted with participants at t = 1, may have a negative impact on the acquisitions from nonparticipants at t = 2. Such term originates from the intermediary compensatory basis scheme (IntCompBas 2 ), which effectively allows intermediaries to pay participants the smaller of the forward or the realized basis (i.e., min(B 1 , B 2 )). Intuitively, when intermediaries with market power increase purchases from non-participants, they end up paying a higher basis (B 2 ). The higher basis applies only to the amount bought from non-participants if B 2 ≥ B 1 , but it applies to purchases from both participants and non-participants if B 2 < B 1 . As a result, if intermediaries have power in the procurement market ( mG m / > 0), the compensatory basis scheme tends to depress the actual post-harvest (B 2 ) basis relative to the forward basis (B 1 ).
Conceptually, the post-harvest Cournot-Nash market equilibrium can be computed by simultaneously solving equations (8) and (9) for all intermediaries, under the restrictions that aggregate purchases from participants and non-participants equal the respective aggregate supplies.
At contracting time (t = 1), the decision problem faced by the m th intermediary is to choose the amount of crop to contract with participants q mG,1 ≡ E 1 (q mG,2 ), which commits firm m to buy at post-harvest the actual participants' output q mG,2 = q mG,1 ε G,2 . Assuming that intermediaries maximize expected post-harvest profits (7), 13 the corresponding FOC (∂E 1 (π m,2 )/∂q mG,1 ) at an interior solution can be written analogously to FOC (9) as follows:
In the above expression, m mG ≥ 0 denotes firm m's power in the market for participants' crop. At the optimum, the greater the value of m mG , the larger the forward basis markdown relative to m's expected net marginal revenue. In the perfectly competitive case where m mG = 0, the markdown is zero and the forward basis equals firm m's expected net marginal revenue.
Comparison of (9) and (10) reveals two key differences between the forward basis (B 1 ) and the realized basis (B 2 ) --in addition, of course, to the fact that the former is established at contracting (t = 1), whereas the latter is set at post-harvest (t = 2). 14 First, relative to the realized basis, the forward basis is augmented by the expected values of the payments related to the basis
) and the put subsidy (E 1 (PutSubsidy 2 ε G,2 )).
Second, intermediaries' procurement market power (m mg ) has greater impact on the realized basis than on the forward basis.
The preceding discussion also shows that, to the extent that intermediaries have market power in the domestic crop market, the intermediary compensatory basis (IntCompBas 2 ) provides an incentive for them to strategically discriminate against non-participants in favor of participants. In the absence of such discrimination, the first term on the right-hand side of (9) would be 1/(1 + mG m / ), and its counterpart in (10) would equal 1/(1 + m mG ).
Best contracting responses for each intermediary can be obtained in the same manner as previously described in connection with expressions (8) and (9), providing as many equations as unknowns. In principle, the Cournot-Nash market equilibrium at contracting (t = 1) can be derived from such set of equations, plus the restriction that the total amount contracted with participants must equal their expected aggregate output Q G,1 = E 1 (Q G,2 ).
Measures of A×C's Welfare Effects
The welfare effects of A×C on participants, non-participants, intermediaries, and final consumers are measured by the respective post-harvest compensating incomes ,2 Taxpayers' direct subsidy outlays for A×C are:
where r is the risk-free interest rate. The first term corresponds to the compensatory basis payments, whereas the terms comprising Call 1 and Put 1 arise from the option subsidies to participants (calls) and intermediaries (puts). Assuming taxpayers are risk-neutral, the compensating income associated with the direct subsidies (T 2 ) equals the negative of the mean outlays.
Importantly, A×C's total cost comprises not only the direct subsidy outlays (T 2 ), but also the administrative cost of operating the program, and the marginal deadweight loss of raising the tax revenues needed to implement A×C. The latter, also called the marginal cost of public funds, is the burden on the rest of the economy arising from the distortions, due to the taxes imposed to raise the funds to support the intervention (Auerbach and Hines 2002) .
Numerical Implementation for Mexico's Corn Market
The model is applied to quantify the market and welfare effects of the A×C program for corn, which is Mexico's main crop. This requires the specification of the various functions involved, including the probability density functions (pdfs) of the exogenous random shocks, and of appropriate values for the underlying parameters. To this end, it is also important to consider numerical issues, such as the choice of methods to compute optimal values and expectations, as well as practical considerations, like parameterization and workability. 17 These topics are the focus of the next subsections.
Specification of Functional Forms
Consistent with an equilibrium displacement framework, cost functions are postulated to be isoelastic, so that
The term κ i > 0 is a scaling parameter, and η i is the cost elasticity. The marginal cost elasticity is given by (η i − 1); hence, η i > 1 is required for increasing marginal costs, and η i ≥ 2 is necessary for marginal cost to rise at an increasing rate. Under certainty and perfect competition, the supply elasticity equals the inverse of the marginal cost elasticity, which facilitates the interpretation and parameterization of
An isoelastic function is also used to represent aggregate demand from final consumers,
, where κ D > 0 is a scaling parameter and η D > 0 is the own-price demand elasticity. Terms ε D,1 > 0 and ε D,2 > 0 are exogenous random shocks to demand (e.g., unexpected changes in consumers' income). Without loss of generality, the demand shock expectations
As in Lence (2009a) , farmers' utility functions are specialized to the constant absolute Futures prices and exchange rates evolve according to F t = F t−1 ε F,t and X t = X t−1 ε X,t for t ∈ {1, 2}, with F 0 , X 0 , and random shocks ε F,t > 0 and ε X,t > 0 exogenously given. Similarly, the exogenous random demand shocks, ε D,t (t ∈ {1, 2}), are identically and independently log-normally distributed. In contrast, following the seminal work by Nelson and Preckel (1989) , the exogenous output shocks ε g,t (g ∈ {G, } G / and t ∈ {1, 2}) are assumed to be conditionally beta distributed. Note that the beta distribution implies that the pdf of output shocks at t = 2 depends on the realized output shock at t = 1 (intuitively, since beta-distributed shocks have a finite support, if ε g,1 is high, the distribution of the corresponding ε g,2 must display higher probabilities of small shocks than if ε g,1 is small; see, e.g., Hennessy (2011) ).
Finally, consistent with the log-normally distributed futures, the at-the-money futures calls (Call 1 ) and puts (Put 1 ) involved in the option subsidies (see expressions (4), (5), and (11)) are assumed to be traded at "fair" values, i.e., Black's arbitrage-free premiums (Black 1976 ).
Parameterization and Calibration
The values used for non-calibrated parameters are reported in table 1. Such values represent estimates based on (a) historical data (e.g., length of planting/contracting and contracting/postharvest periods, and parameters of shocks' pdfs), or (b) reasonable assumptions about the underlying objects (e.g., cost elasticities and own-price elasticity of demand for final product).
All intermediaries are assumed to have the same cost functions, so that κ mD = κ MD and As formulated in Section 2, the model implies that the vast majority of the years would be characterized by compensatory basis payments to intermediaries rather than participants (i.e., B 1 > B 2 ). However, this implication is contradicted by the historical record, as that there have been more years featuring B 1 < B 2 than B 1 > B 2 . 20 Therefore, to reconcile the model results with the historical evidence, the constraint B 1 ≤ E 1 (B 2 ) was added. This restriction ensures that, on average, the compensatory basis received by participants is at least as large as the compensatory basis received by intermediaries.
For the simulations assuming risk-averse producers, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is standardized by setting it equal to ˆg λ = 3.1/ 0 ,2 ( )
, where ,2
A C g π × denotes the equilibrium post-harvest profits for g-type producers in the A×C scenario. 21 This approach follows Lence (2009a) and ensures that the expected coefficient of relative risk aversion is exactly 3.1 under A×C (which is the scenario used for the calibration), and very close to 3.1 in the scenario without A×C. This value is used by Zant (2001, p. 700) , and is well within the range considered typical (Gollier 2001, pp. 31 and 289; Kocherlakota 1996) .
The number of farmers (n g ) can be chosen arbitrarily because, as explained in the next paragraph, production cost scaling parameters κ g (g ∈ {G, }) G / are set by calibration.
facilitate computations, the number of farmers is set equal to the mean aggregate output used for 
Numerical Methods to Compute the Solution
To compute the rational expectations of the model's endogenous variables (e.g., output and prices) at planting-time, one must first solve for the market equilibrium conditions under each possible state of the world at contracting and post-harvest times. This task is non-trivial, because the model has no closed-form solution and is highly nonlinear.
To compute expectations, the exogenous random shocks' pdfs are approximated by Gaussian quadrature (Judd 1998) , so that each state of the world is represented by a quadrature node. Letting # i,t denote the number of nodes corresponding to exogenous random variable ε i,t (i ∈ {G, , G / F, X, D} and t ∈ {1, 2}), solving the model requires calculating
t equilibrium values for each of the endogenous variables at t ∈ {1, 2}. Since the computational burden increases exponentially with the number of nodes, to obtain an acceptable level of accuracy while maintaining tractability, # i,t = 3 nodes were used for i ∈ {G, , G / F, X, D} and t ∈ {1, 2}.
The model was solved numerically by function iteration (Miranda and Fackler 2002, Ch. 3), employing the programming language MATLAB version R2014a 64-bit. The iteration steps are outlined in the Online Appendix C, and the Gaussian quadrature was implemented with the computer routines developed by Miranda and Fackler (2013) .
Results and Discussion
In the interest of space, we focus on the impact of introducing A×C into a scenario without government intervention, for selected parameterizations. Further, it is assumed that neither participants nor intermediaries would buy CME futures options if it weren't for the A×C subsidies.
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The market effects caused by the introduction of A×C are summarized in table 3. To illustrate the contents of this table, consider the cell at the intersection of the "Net Prices
Received by Participants" row with the "Risk-Averse Producers" column. This cell shows that, compared to the no-program scenario, A×C increases the mean of the net corn price received by participants by 4.8%, and reduces its standard deviation by 14.5%. Analogously, the 10%, 50%, and 90% quantiles of the pdfs of the net corn price received by participants are respectively 11.1% higher, 2.4% higher, and 1.4% smaller under A×C.
The most noticeable price effects of A×C are the increase in the mean net price received by participants (4.8% to 5.3%), the even larger fall in the mean net price paid to participants (5.6% to 6.0%), and the substantial reductions in their standard deviations (14.5% to 18.5% for prices received, and 28.8% to 32.2% for prices paid). The mean and standard deviation of the net prices received by and paid to non-participants also decrease, but by smaller amounts. Since A×C reduces the mean and the standard deviations of the prices paid to both participants and non-participants, intermediaries benefit regardless of the type of farmers from whom they buy.
The quantile changes reveal that the higher (lower) mean and the lower standard deviation in the net price received by (paid to) participants stems mostly from the smaller probability of occurrence of low (high) prices. A×C causes output to rise for participants, and fall for non-participants (see table 3 ).
Under risk-neutrality, the resulting own-price supply elasticity is approximately 0.67 (= 3.6/5.3 for participants and = −0.3/(−0.5) for non-participants), which is the value one would obtain under certainty given the assumed production cost elasticity (see Subsection 3.1). In contrast, output changes under risk aversion imply supply elasticities larger than 0.67 for participants and smaller than 0.67 for non-participants. Such difference in price elasticities is caused by the lower price volatility associated with A×C, which tends to increase production for both participants and non-participants under risk aversion. This volatility effect reinforces (partly offsets) the output response of participants (non-participants) to the program's higher (lower) prices.
The impact of A×C on domestic consumption is positive, but negligible. Regardless of risk preferences, imports fall due to the rise in aggregate domestic output. However, the contraction in imports is larger when farmers are risk averse, because of the aforementioned positive production response to lower price volatility.
A×C has a substantial impact on profits. Mean profits for participants and intermediaries experience a sizeable boost (of 8.5% to 9.2% and 4.0% to 5.3%, respectively), whereas mean profits for non-participants decline (by 0.7% to 1.5%).
Welfare Effects
To interpret the welfare results, it is important to note that government intervention in the present model may enhance total net surplus for two reasons. First, the scenario without A×C assumes that intermediaries have market power, i.e., it is not a first-best market outcome. Thus, A×C may increase total net surplus if it moves equilibrium outcomes closer to the intervention-free competitive equilibrium (e.g., Romano 1988 Regardless of risk preferences, doubling intermediaries' procurement market power increases A×C's losses to non-participants, reduces the benefits to participants, and raises taxpayers' costs and society's deadweight losses from tax collection. Contrastingly, higher market power significantly boosts intermediaries' gains. In fact, doubling market power in the presence of risk-averse producers raises intermediaries' gains by 26 (= 136 − 110) million dollars, which exceeds the benefit reductions and/or loss increases accruing to all of the other sectors combined (22 million dollars). As a result, somewhat counterintuitively, the scenario with higher intermediaries' market power has a smaller total net surplus loss (52 million dollars vs. 56 million dollars).
Participants' welfare gains are slightly smaller under risk aversion than under risk neutrality. This result is explained by the fact that under risk aversion A×C increases participants' mean profits by less than under risk neutrality, and it slightly increases the standard deviation of participants' profits (see table 3 ). Non-participants also experience greater welfare losses under risk aversion compared to risk neutrality. Given the profit figures reported in table 3, this outcome implies that for non-participants, the loss in mean profits caused by A×C outweighs the benefits associated with the smaller standard deviation of profits.
Overall, risk aversion has a positive and sizeable effect on total net surplus, but not large enough to revert the program's negative impact on total welfare. If the main purpose of the government intervention is to reduce producers' risks, A×C seems an expensive and inefficient way to achieve that goal.
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Despite the substantial transfers across sectors associated with A×C, the standard deadweight loss triangles (i.e., the deadweight losses assuming risk neutrality, and ignoring administrative costs and the costs of raising public funds) are small. The large import cost elasticity adopted for the simulations implies that, leaving aside administrative costs and the costs of raising public funds, the main deadweight losses are due to overproduction by participants and underproduction by non-participants. Evaluated at the means, participants' standard deadweight loss triangle amounts to less than 2 million dollars, and non-participants' loss triangle is even smaller. 27 Clearly, the standard deadweight loss triangles are dwarfed by the administrative cost and the allocative inefficiencies on the general economy induced by the taxes levied to fund A×C.
Welfare Effects when A×C Reduces Intermediaries' Market Power
The preceding analysis assumes that intermediaries' market power, when procuring crops from domestic producers, is the same in the scenario with A×C ( When A×C cuts market power as much as feasible, the main beneficiaries are participants, followed by non-participants; consumers benefit the least. The gains to participants, non-participants, and consumers, the taxpayers' losses, and the costs of public funds are all larger The surplus changes computed by assuming market power is reduced, minus the surplus changes calculated under the assumption that A×C leaves market power the same, can be termed the marginal gains from reducing market power. Such gains are quite large for producers, and greater for non-participants than for participants. 29 Marginal gains are smaller but still sizeable for consumers.
Significantly, even under the extreme assumption that A×C reduces market power as much as possible, the program causes sizeable total losses. Moreover, if producers are risk averse, the total loss is larger for the scenario with the maximum market power reduction (57 to 62 million dollars) than for the scenario where market power is unchanged (50 million dollars).
In short, the efficiency gains from reducing intermediaries' market power are small relative to the cost of A×C. As a result, A×C has a substantial negative impact on total surplus, regardless of whether it reduces intermediaries' market power or not.
Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to perform market and welfare effects of Mexico's A×C program. A×C not only has involved substantial government expenditures in recent years, but also exhibits unique features, like the provision of basis subsidies and subsidized CME futures options to both producers and intermediaries. To capture A×C's key characteristics, the proposed model incorporates uncertainty, and includes intermediaries possessing market power. The model also allows participants and intermediaries to sign A×C forward contracts after planting, but before harvest.
Our analysis focuses on Mexico's corn market. A×C shifts the pdf of the net price received by participants to the right and makes it more right-skewed, whereas it has the opposite effect on the pdf of the net prices paid by intermediaries to participants. Overall, the mean net price received by (paid to) participants increases by about 5% (decreases by almost 6%), and the mean net prices received by non-participants decline by approximately 1%. A×C also reduces the standard deviation of the prices received by producers and paid by intermediaries. The impact on profits is substantial: mean profits jump by around 9% for participants, and 4% to 5% for intermediaries, but shrink by about 1% for non-participants.
Assuming that A×C does not change intermediaries' market power, it is estimated to yield annual losses in aggregate welfare of about 50 (70) million dollars if producers are risk-averse (risk-neutral). If anything, such figures are likely to underestimate the actual losses, because very conservative assumptions are used to compute administration costs and the marginal cost of public funds. In addition, it is assumed that the government purchases the CME futures options for the A×C program at "fair" values and without incurring transaction costs.
Intermediaries and participants benefit the most from A×C. Taxpayers are the biggest losers, spending almost 200 million dollars in direct subsidies alone, plus the sizable administration costs. Non-participants also suffer large surplus losses. In addition, society as a whole experiences substantial inefficiency losses due to the need to collect taxes to fund A×C.
Importantly, even if A×C reduced intermediaries' market power to the largest extent feasible, it would still cause substantial losses in aggregate welfare. In such circumstances, however, introducing A×C would benefit all producers (both participants as well as nonparticipants) the most, while leaving intermediaries' surplus unchanged.
Some other aspects of A×C also deserve attention. For example, A×C contracts fix dollar-denominated forward prices, which leaves producers and intermediaries exposed to foreign exchange risk. More importantly, unless one is willing to assume that A×C is able to significantly curtail intermediaries' market power, the program is quite regressive, as most of its benefits are captured by intermediaries (which are typically large firms).
In summary, despite A×C's novel features, the present analysis suggests that it causes substantial losses in aggregate economic surplus for the case of corn. Neither the mitigation of price risks nor the reduction in intermediaries' market power seem capable of yielding producer surplus gains large enough to compensate for A×C's significant cost. Hence, it would seem necessary to invoke other types of benefits to justify the program from an economic standpoint.
Such benefits might include, among others, fostering the development of local derivative markets by familiarizing farmers with hedging instruments commonly used in developed countries, enhancing farmers' terms of financing through intermediaries, and making farmers more willing to switch to higher revenue crops if they are under A×C. Measuring the extent of such benefits would be an important area of inquiry for future research regarding the A×C program.
Endnotes
1. To streamline the exposition, in the rest of the article U.S. dollars will be referred to simply as "dollars."
2. It must be pointed out, however, that numerous studies (e.g., Steffen and Echánove 2007 , Fox and Haight 2010 , Verteramo Chiu and Turvey 2014 , and Appendini 2014 have addressed other aspects of A×C.
3. In the present study, the term "intermediaries" is used to refer generically to firms involved in the assembling, handling, and processing of raw commodities acquired from primary producers, and the distribution of processed products sold to final consumers. DGIB (2012) shows that there is a large number of regulations that limit competition in many local markets.
5. For simplicity, in the remainder of the article "peso" will be used instead of "Mexican peso."
6. "Ingreso objetivo" paid out much less than A×C because market prices were typically above the set minimum prices.
7. More specifically, the areas planted with corn, sorghum, and wheat were respectively 69%, 18%, and 8% of the total.
8. The ratio of ending stocks to annual consumption for corn ranged from 0.093 to 0.163 over the period (SIAP 2009 . The ratio of speculative storage demand to current consumption demand must have been even smaller than such figures, because ending stocks comprise working stocks in addition to speculative stocks (Kohls and Uhl 1990) . Although in practice it is impossible to determine the share of ending stocks held for speculative purposes, it is unlikely to be high because of the deficiencies in storage infrastructure (SAGARPA 2010b) . For example, a study by the World Bank (2007, p. 8) concluded that 'Mexico's storage infrastructure does not meet minimum standards, and lacks competency and instruments to finance stocks in warehouses.' (translation of ours).
9. As explained in the previous section, farmers (intermediaries) are legally obligated to deliver (Chen 1985, and Yang 1995) . Therefore, the rest of the discussion will proceed as if min(B 1 , B 2 ) were differentiable everywhere.
12. In the standard textbook specification (e.g., Tirole 1988, p. 219) , m mD is defined as firm m's market share divided by the own-price elasticity of demand. At the FOCs corresponding to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, m mD equals firm m's Lerner index (Lerner 1934) .
13. The case of risk-averse intermediaries is not analyzed because it is not workable. However, risk-neutrality is a reasonable approximation because intermediaries are much better able to diversify risks than producers.
14. In the Online Appendix A, a highly simplified version of the model is used to show the key drivers of basis risk. 17. For example, the cost and demand functions discussed below are chosen because values for their parameters (elasticities and scaling factors) can easily set and interpreted based on actual data and previous studies. More involved functional forms can be used, but typically their parameterization is not as straightforward.
18. Cost functions are assumed to be non-stochastic to avoid the curse of dimensionality.
Stochastic costs could be obtained by incorporating multiplicative exogenous random shocks
19. In other words, the A×C program is assumed to have no effect on the world crop market or the exchange rate.
20. Uncovering the reasons why intermediaries' incentives have not materialized into larger (on average) compensatory basis payments to them instead of participants is beyond the scope of the present study. One plausible reason might be that under A×C both the forward basis as well as the post-harvest basis are negotiated by representatives of intermediaries, participants, and government officials. Such mechanism may prevent intermediaries from setting bases so as to receive compensatory basis payments most of the years.
21. To allow for the possibility of non-participants being less risk averse than participants, we also conducted simulations assuming risk-neutral non-participants (ˆG λ / = 0) and risk-averse averse participants with ˆG λ = 3.1/ 0 ,2 ( )
Results are omitted in the interest of space, but are available in the Online Appendix B.
22. The value chosen to parameterize the number of farmers is arbitrary, because any change to it will be offset by a change in the calibrated value of κ g , so as to leave aggregate mean output ,2 g Q the same.
23. Since in theory A×C has no downside for producers, all of them would participate if they could do so. In reality, however, participation involves registration and other costs that make the program less appealing or out of reach for small farmers (Steffen and Echánove 2007) , and the scope of A×C is limited by government budget constraints (Echánove 2009 ). As a result, actual data indicate that participants are "commercial" producers, whereas nonparticipants are small farmers (Echánove 2009 ). The model assumes that at planting time farmers know whether they will be able to participate or not.
24. The calibration is performed under the A×C parameterization, because the historical observations correspond to a period when the A×C program was in place.
25. The merits of providing government subsidies to promote the use of risk management tools already available (such as CME futures options) are debatable. However, if the tools were not used without the subsidies, the latter would be easier to rationalize (e.g., one might argue that the subsidies help familiarize agents with hedging instruments). Hence, although it is straightforward to perform the no-A×C simulations allowing for hedging, we restrict attention to the no-A×C scenario where neither participants nor intermediaries trade derivatives. The case analyzed is also the most interesting, as it involves the largest market and welfare effects across all sectors. If one assumes that participants and intermediaries buy options even if subsidies are not provided, A×C's market and welfare impacts are less pronounced. In the limiting no-A×C case where participants and intermediaries are fully hedged with options, introducing option subsidies would have essentially no effect in the amount produced by participants, and consequently little impact on imports, consumption, and non-participants' output. In such instance; the subsidies would simply be pure transfers from taxpayers and society to participants and intermediaries, with no consequences for nonparticipants or consumers.
26. An anonymous reviewer noted that Verteramo Chiu and Turvey's market-based quanto options (Verteramo Chiu and Turvey 2014), which require no taxpayers' money, could provide an alternative price hedging mechanism to A×C. 
